Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology

Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator

Public Choice, 1981, vol. 37, issue 1, 59 pages

Abstract: Treaties to limit strategic arms, such as those resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), are generally viewed as resulting in a reduced level of military spending and an increased level of security for both countries. This paper shows that such treaties generally would accelerate the qualitative arms race and could lead to the introduction of new and potentially destabilizing weapon systems. Thus, the result might be an increase in military spending and a decrease in the level of security for both countries. This result is supported by a formal model of bureaucratic decision making, in which defense bureaus choose between purchases of existing weapons systems or research and development expenditures on new weapons systems. The formal model leads to two theorems which identify the conditions under which arms limitation treaties lead to innovations in weapons technology and to increased military spending. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981

Date: 1981
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124231

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