Voluntary purchase of public goods

Douglas Young

Public Choice, 1982, vol. 38, issue 1, 73-85

Abstract: This paper examines the application of Buchanan's ‘independent adjustment’ model of public good provision to individual donations to voluntary or non-profit organizations. An individual's donation function is a simple transformation of the Marshallian demand function; consequently donation functions ‘reveal,’ in principle, preferences for public goods. The existence of a tax-subsidy system sustaining a Pareto optimal level of provision is demonstrated, and the relationship to the existing subsidy scheme in the U.S. is examined. Finally, two implications of the model suggest that it is not appropriate as a representation of actual donor behavior. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Date: 1982
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124629

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