Senatorial responsiveness, the characteristics of the polity and the political cycle

Kenneth Greene and Hadi Salavitabar

Public Choice, 1982, vol. 38, issue 3, 263-269

Abstract: Before one can measure the independence of a Senator from his constituent interests by measuring the differences between his rating by an organization like the Conservative Coalition and the average rating of Congressmen in his state, one must articulate the underlying model describing whose preferences the Congressman represents. If the median voter model is used, then one must further define one's assumption about the shape of the underlying distribution of preferences in each district. If the distribution is normal, then the Amacher-Boyes measure is acceptable, if it is not, then another measure is implied. We have assumed that the underlying distribution is lognormal and have deduced alternative independence scores. We have shown that the characteristics of a Senator's polity apparently do influence his independence score. Bigger and less homogeneous polities possess Senators that are more independent. We do not find any evidence that there is a political cycle in senatorial independence. This does not mean to deny, however, that Frey and Schneider (1978) have found some support for a political business cycle and Pommerehne, Frey and Schneider (1978) have found evidence for the possibility that nearness to election may hold down public personnel expenditures. Our data merely indicates a lack of corroboration of the importance of the political cycle for some reasonable measures of representational independence. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Date: 1982
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00144852

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