Representative voter or bureaucratic manipulation: An examination of public finances in California before and after Proposition 13

Allan Zelenitz

Public Choice, 1982, vol. 39, issue 1, 143-145

Date: 1982
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00242152 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:1:p:143-145

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF00242152

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().