 A limited defense of Pareto optimal redistributionPublic Choice, 1982, vol. 39, issue 2, 277-282 Abstract: Pasour's paper is correct in pointing out that the utility interdependency approach fails to completely explain the pattern of redistribution which exists in society and to set definitive normative standards for what redistribution should be. This clearly does not justify, however, his conclusion that the approach is ‘an empty economic box.’ A half full box is not empty. As suggested here, this approach is particularly valuable in understanding the existence and the form of many transfer schemes which cannot be fully explained by other factors. As a normative guide, this approach suffers from the deficiencies which always arise when there is an attempt to use Pareto optimality as a guide for public policy, i.e., it seldom yields a single definitive outcome which can be designated as the most desirable. With all of its limitations, the use of Pareto optimality as a (limited) guide to redistribution questions is infinitely superior to the approach often used of envoking a social welfare function to deal with such questions. Distribution questions which cannot be resolved using the standard of Pareto optimality are ones for which there are no generally acceptable normative standards for making such decisions. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982 Date: 1982 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:2:p:277-282 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/BF00162119 Access Statistics for this article Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II More articles in Public Choice from Springer |
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