Beliefs and errors in voting choices: A restatement of the theory of fiscal illusion

Richard Carter

Public Choice, 1982, vol. 39, issue 3, 343-360

Abstract: This paper reformulates the theory of fiscal illusion to make it more compatible with the median-voter model of collective choice. It emphasizes the requirement that misperceptions about marginal tax-costs and benefits must be permanent to have any significant effect on the level of public expenditures. The Lancaster-Becker model of consumer demand is then used to demonstrate the peculiar effects of permanent misperceptions on consumer demand. It can be shown, for example, that other things being the same, a Republican who underestimates continuously the marginal benefits of public activities may demand more public goods than a Democrat who overestimates those same benefits in a permanent fashion. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Date: 1982
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00118792

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