Toward an informational dynamics of collective choice

Pam Brown

Public Choice, 1982, vol. 39, issue 3, 415-420

Abstract: In the following argument, it is suggested that the informational dimension of small-scale collective choice systems be introduced into the set of explanatory variables, be allowed to fluctuate while the ‘committee’ is in session and, finally, be permitted to “feed back” to the individual participants during the group decision process. It is suggested that consideration of the in-period or ‘in-committee’ shocks which this release and flow of information may be modeled to have on the participants’ round-to-round voting strategies might provide a supplementary explanation of some of the anomalous results (such as the relative rarity of observed cycling) encountered in observations of collectively controlled systems. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Date: 1982
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00118797 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:3:p:415-420

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF00118797

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().