Economic competition and political competition: An empirical note

Thomas Dilorenzo

Public Choice, 1983, vol. 40, issue 2, 203-209

Abstract: This paper has examined the proposition that more concentrated or consolidated metropolitan areas will produce public goods less efficiently than if there were a greater degree of interjurisdictional competition. The empirical evidence garnered in Section 3 suggests that interjurisdictional competition does tend to reduce the cost of providing local public services and, consequently, local government expenditure levels. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Date: 1983
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00118522

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