The power of the chairman

Richard Niemi, Bo Bjurulf and Gordon Blewis

Public Choice, 1983, vol. 40, issue 3, 293-305

Abstract: Our results here demonstrate rather convincingly what our intuition tells us is correct. A chairman with a regular and tie-breaking vote is more likely to get his first choice than is a person with only a regular vote, and a person with a regular vote is more likely to get his way than is a chairman with only a tiebreaking vote. In addition, if ties occur, a non-member who is chairman is more likely to get his first choice than is a regular member. These results hold for sincere and sophisticated voting and for the successive and amendment procedures. They hold — only more so — if the chairman controls the agenda. At least for these binary procedures, Farquharson's conclusion should have been: Seek a tie-breaking vote if you do not have to give up a regular vote to obtain it; shun the power to break ties if it means giving up a regular vote. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Date: 1983
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00114525

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