On the stability of legislative outcomes

Stephen Hoenack

Public Choice, 1983, vol. 41, issue 2, 260 pages

Abstract: This paper argues that by arranging vote trades in the face of information costs, legislative committees contribute to the stability of legislative outcomes. A structure of permanent committees and subcommittees facilitates informational specialization and helps legislators acquire experience in their specializations. Committees arrange vote trades by adjusting amounts of recommended spending on separate items in bills that receive majority support. Each legislator is allotted a roughly equal amount of legislative spending that he can influence plus an additional amount that depends on his skill and experience as a committee member. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Date: 1983
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00210359

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