Post election redistributive strategies of representatives: A partial theory of the politics of redistribution

Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer

Public Choice, 1984, vol. 42, issue 2, 113-131

Abstract: Vote maximizing candidates for reelection often have an incentive to redistribute income. They target certain constituent groups as recipients for income transfers and others as income losers. Resulting situations bifurcate sharply. Some have characteristics of ‘fairness’ and moderation and others of exploitation. The conditions which lead to these sorts of situations are identified. It is shown that recipients of income transfers need not be central members of the incumbents' coalitions but rather may at times be ‘fence straddlers.’ Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Date: 1984
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124155

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