Preference revelation and supply response in the arena of local government

D. Kenyon

Public Choice, 1984, vol. 42, issue 2, 147-160

Abstract: This paper represents an initial effort to build a model of the demand revelation and supply response mechanisms implicit in the effect of citizen lobbying efforts on the decisions of municipal officials. A utilitarian social welfare function was used as a benchmark to judge the results of this lobbying model. The empirical evidence presented indicated that both elected and appointed city officials in Ann Arbor respond to citizen lobbying opposing or supporting particular zoning amendment proposals. The normative evaluation of this response produced mixed results. Much of the public choice/public finance literature has focused on a search for a new demand revealing mechanism that would circumvent the free rider problem. This approach was criticized by Bohm (1979) for not producing politically acceptable demand revealing mechanisms; recent research indicates some uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the free rider problem. An alternative approach taken by this paper is to examine the workings and efficiency properties of previously ignored and already existing mechanisms for revelation of demand. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Date: 1984
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124157

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