Social choice and the status quo

Jeffrey Richelson

Public Choice, 1984, vol. 42, issue 3, 225-234

Abstract: I have investigated the social choice problem from the perspective of seeking to insure that a majority of voters are not worse off after the election, such that worse off means selecting an alternative that would lose to the status quo in a majority contest. This investigation led rather naturally to using the status quo as a benchmark against which to judge challengers. Both the F dm and F * dm procedures have attractive properties. Both satisfy the Not Worse-Off and Majority Improvement Principles. The F dm rule is rationalizable by a transitive R and allows for ease of voter response, while the F dm* rule satisfies binary Pareto. Both satisfy IIA, anonymity and (m − 1) neutrality. Examination of the results of repeated applications of the F dm procedure reveals that these results are heavily influenced by the starting point, with there being no guarantee that the process will move into the minmax, M-dominant, or similar solution set. Whether this is considered acceptable will depend on whether one believes the social choice should be a subset of these sets regardless of the identity of the status quo. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Date: 1984
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124942

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