Maximizing models of legislative choice

Ronald Warren

Public Choice, 1984, vol. 42, issue 3, 287-294

Abstract: A number of recent studies have reported estimates of single equation and simultaneous equations models of the decisions of state legislatures. These investigations have been ‘economic’ ones, in the sense that considerations of the relative costs and benefits to some self-interested person or group capable of affecting legislative outcomes have motivated the choice of explanatory variables. Thus, perhaps implicitly, these studies have assumed utility maximization by some critical agent(s) in the political marketplace. This essay draws attention to the implications of this maximizing assumption for the proper specification and estimation of the associated empirical models. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Date: 1984
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124947

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