Sequential referenda and bureaucratic man

Kenneth Greene

Public Choice, 1984, vol. 43, issue 1, 77-82

Abstract: The bulk of our evidence from studying sequential proposals in a multiple round school finance referenda process is consistent with the assumption that the school administrators act non-strategically to maximize the size of their budget rather than with the alternative hypotheses. This is another piece of evidence indicating that the ability of a system of government to provide what is desired of it by the average or median voter will ultimately depend on the structure of government and whether it induces competitive supply rather than on the regard of its public servants for serving public interests. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Date: 1984
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00137907

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