Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules

Manimay Sen

Public Choice, 1984, vol. 43, issue 3, 285 pages

Abstract: We formalize a class of ‘positional’ systems, and examine the problem of strategic misrevelation of preferences under these systems. The positional systems we consider include a wide class of ranking or point systems, which are variants of the Borda Procedure. We show that all of these systems afford scope for manipulation of social decisions through misrevelation. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Date: 1984
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00118936 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:43:y:1984:i:3:p:251-285

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF00118936

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().