Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter
Ingemar Hansson and
Charles Stuart
Public Choice, 1984, vol. 44, issue 3, 441 pages
Abstract:
We examine equilibrium voting strategies for elections with interested politicians facing uncertainty about voter pReferences. If politicians' utilities are defined over the set of strategies that voters select (instead of being dependent only on the probability of winning an election), equilibrium strategies will diverge (instead of converging to the median voter's pReferences) as long as politicians have different pReferences. We present conditions (i) for political compromise, and (ii) for politicians with different utility functions to merge into parties with complete strategic agreement. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984
Date: 1984
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00119691 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:44:y:1984:i:3:p:431-441
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/BF00119691
Access Statistics for this article
Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II
More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().