The Canadian constitutional amending formula: Bargaining in the past and the future

D. Kilgour and Terrence Levesque

Public Choice, 1984, vol. 44, issue 3, 457-480

Abstract: The amending formula of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982 is analysed and assessed, as are a variety of alternative formulae, some of which were actually proposed and then rejected. The models and techniques of game theory provide measurements of the power and satisfaction of the individual provinces under the various amending procedures. Thus, past and future provincial bargaining positions can be compared with provincial interests, and several potential outcomes for future bargaining can be projected. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Date: 1984
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00119694

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