Philantropic motives and contribution policy: A note

Joseph Deutsch

Public Choice, 1984, vol. 44, issue 3, 505 pages

Abstract: This note analyzes the results of Ben-Zion and Spiegel regarding different forms of transfer from rich persons to poor ones. Assuming a more general utility function, not necessarily additive or homothetic, this note shows that a combined policy of income transfer with specific subsidy to the poor consumer can lead to an optimal solution (first best) from the donor's point of view. If it is not possible to differentiate between consumers, a system of subsidy to all consumers can achieve a second best solution. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Date: 1984
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00119696

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