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Public choice and three ethical properties of politics

Joe Oppenheimer

Public Choice, 1985, vol. 45, issue 3, 255 pages

Abstract: Three major public choice findings about politics are analyzed for their implications regarding ethics and ethical analysis. The assumption that governments supply collective goods, and the ensuing implication that it is rational to stay ignorant is shown to decrease the moral involvement of the individual in political behavior. The difficulty of obtaining a stable political outcome with regard to distributive issues is shown to affect the relationship between fair political procedures and the attainment of justice. It is argued that the pursuit of justice may require the abandonment of procedural fairness. Implications of these findings for ethical reasoning are then discussed. Finally, questions regarding the relationship between the rather imperfect findings of the public choice theorist and their ethical implications for the political philosopher are raised. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Date: 1985
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124022

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