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A precise method for evaluating election schemes

Robert Bordley

Public Choice, 1985, vol. 46, issue 2, 113-123

Abstract: A previously published paper evaluated election schemes under a wide variety of election circumstances. This paper improves upon the previous work by refining the measures used to rate the election schemes and increasing the statistical significance of those ratings. With these modifications, we can now draw some new conclusions: (a) In general circumstances, the Borda System outperforms the Copeland System which outperforms Approval which outperforms Majority Rule. (b) The Maximin Rule — strongly supported by Rawls's — turns out to be a reasonable election rule if the number of election alternatives is large relative to the number of voters. (c) With two exceptions, all our election systems performed quite well given a society with highly correlated utilities. (d) Given a polarized society, a serial dictatorship was better than every other election system except Borda. Perhaps even more importantly, we now have the possibility of conducting some cost/benefit analyses of different proposals for electoral changes. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Date: 1985
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00179734

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