A positive theory of in-kind transfers and the negative income tax

Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard

Public Choice, 1985, vol. 47, issue 1, 265 pages

Abstract: Normative arguments for restricting redistribution to cash transfers or a negative income tax have not appealed to politicians or their constituents. All modern governments redistribute income in kind and provide goods and services that can be produced and distributed privately. At times public and private supply coexist. Housing services, medical care, and education are examples, but so too are safety and many regulatory activities of government. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Date: 1985
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00119359

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