A note on the importance of cost structures for the behavior of Political Action Committees

Daniel Richards

Public Choice, 1986, vol. 48, issue 1, 79 pages

Abstract: In sum, the cost environment in which PACs operate will directly influence both their behavior and their ability to ‘buy’ political benefits. Recognition of these effects implies that the conclusions of earlier studies that different PACs follow inherently different strategies, or that PACs are not rational in their contributory allocations are premature, and indeed, insupportable in the absence of cost analysis. Attention to costs also suggests that some important econometric problems may attend the investigation of PAC behavior. The real lesson to learn, however, is not that there are a number of pitfalls in past or perhaps future research. Rather, the key point is the need for an analysis of the cost side of political participation. Such work is necessary if a satisfactory model of PAC behavior is to be developed. Moreover, it would constitute an important step in building a general equilibrium model of policy outcomes in which the level of political activity is itself endogenous. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Date: 1986
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00239562

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