Truth-telling, dominant strategies, and iterative Groves mechanisms

Susan Cohen

Public Choice, 1986, vol. 51, issue 3, 333-343

Abstract: This essay demonstrates that if an organization uses a price-decomposition algorithm to solve a decentralized resource allocation problem, in which rewards are those of a Groves mechanism, then truth-telling remains a dominant-strategy equilibrium. Earlier work shows that for a general class of non-linear programming algorithms, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium that weakly dominates all other Nash equilibria, but it is not necessarily a dominant-strategy equilibrium. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Date: 1986
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00128881

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