Your vote counts on account of the way it is counted: An institutional solution to the paradox of not voting

Thomas Schwartz

Public Choice, 1987, vol. 54, issue 2, 121 pages

Abstract: When we explicitly lay out all its steps, we find that the Paradox of Not Voting (since the chance of one vote's making a difference is about zero, why trouble to vote?) rests on a false but hitherto unremarked assumption about the institutional context of elections. My solution to the Paradox is more conservative than others that have been proposed, and it yields a rational-choice model of voting whose consequence accord well with empirical findings on turnout. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00123001

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