Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting

David Austen-Smith

Public Choice, 1987, vol. 54, issue 2, 123-139

Abstract: This essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral-policy decisions of candidates for office. Interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates' policies and opposing groups' donations remain unaltered. Candidates, however, recognize that their policy choices affect contributions. Campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy-oriented voters' perceptions of candidates' positions. In this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates' electoral policies, and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00123002

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