A theory of the spoils system

Roy Gardner

Public Choice, 1987, vol. 54, issue 2, 185 pages

Abstract: In a spoils system, it is axiomatic that ‘to the winners go the spoils.’ This essay formalizes spoils systems as cooperative games, with winners given by a simple game structure, and represented by a fixed number of political appointments. We analyze the resulting spoils games by means of the non-transferable utility value, and we offer two practical applications of the results. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00123004

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