A note on Nanson's rule

Emerson Niou

Public Choice, 1987, vol. 54, issue 2, 193 pages

Abstract: E.J. Nanson, in 1883, proposed a voting rule designed mainly to select the Condorcet winner. Unfortunately, much of the collective choice literature has misstated Nanson's rule. This note shows that the misstated versions of the rule and Nanson's actual rule can yield different outcomes, and it provides a counter example, which shows that Nanson's rule, although it satisfies the strong Condorcet condition, does not satisfy the weak Condorcet condition. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00123006

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