Agency audits and congressional oversight: The impact of state tax burdens on GAO audit requests

David Willison

Public Choice, 1987, vol. 54, issue 3, 277-281

Abstract: The results presented above provide fairly substantial empirical support for Niskanen's argument that levels of taxation are related to the supply of oversight among legislators. Although the probit model estimated was not overwhelmingly useful in accounting for the observed variance, state tax shares were significantly related to oversight measured in terms of audit requests. Indeed, as the findings indicate, the taxation-oversight relationship remains across both Republicans and Democrats and differing levels of legislative seniority. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00125650

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