Laissez-faire in campaign finance

W. Crain, Robert Tollison and Donald Leavens

Public Choice, 1988, vol. 56, issue 3, 212 pages

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the impact of campaign contribution limits on government expenditures. The theory is based on the proclivity of geographic-based legislators to support wealth transfers from the polity at large to finance benefits for local constituents. It predicts that laissez-faire in contributions will lead to less government spending on budgetary redistribution and to a greater output of laws by the legislature. The theory is tested using data on U.S. State governments. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988

Date: 1988
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00130271

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