Monetary policy and presidential elections: A nonpartisan political cycle

David Hakes

Public Choice, 1988, vol. 57, issue 2, 175-182

Abstract: This paper develops a Federal Reserve reaction function which relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives. Pre- and postpresidential election estimates of this reaction function for the post-Accord period of 1953–1984 suggest two conclusions: (1) the Federal Reserve reacts differently to economic conditions in the pre- and postelection biennia and (2) these differences in Fed behavior are not likely the result of partisan political influence, but rather the result of self-restraint by the Fed during preelection periods. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Date: 1988
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00052404 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:57:y:1988:i:2:p:175-182

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF00052404

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().