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Symbol versus substance in legislative activity: The case of illegal immigration

H. Moehring

Public Choice, 1988, vol. 57, issue 3, 287-294

Abstract: Although much research indicates that the United States benefits from illegal immigration, public opinion polls indicate the public wants immigration law enforced. See citation of June 1980 Roper Poll by the former Attorney General of the United States in the Introduction to U.S. Immigration Policy, edited by R.R. Hofstetter (1984). If there are parties who are adversely affected by the restriction of illegals, and those effects are sufficiently concentrated that it pays the parties to organize and lobby, the results of this paper should be expected. Politicians have incentives to demonstrate a restrictive stance on illegal immigration to appease general public opinion. That is why bills have been repeatedly proposed in spite of the long history of legislative failure of such attempts. Coincident with proposed restrictions, the growth of the funding for the enforcement agency declines. Such de jure concern but de facto neglect is the way a politician could rationally deal with such conflicting demands. One would expect such behavior to be manifest in political realms other than that of illegal immigration. Prostitution and drinking laws are obvious examples. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Date: 1988
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124812

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