Rent-seeking and market structure: Comment

Russell Pittman

Public Choice, 1988, vol. 58, issue 2, 173-185

Abstract: If the firms in an industry are to be successful in raising money to influence government, two conditions must be met: (1) there must be sufficient rents available from government decisions regarding that industry to make such expenditures worthwhile, and (2) the industry must be sufficiently concentrated to avoid a free-rider problem in fund-raising. This argument, though seemingly intuitively appealing, has been under recent empirical attack; this paper seeks to restore the parapets. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Date: 1988
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00125722

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