Is vote-selling desirable?

Jeffrey Weiss

Public Choice, 1988, vol. 59, issue 2, 177-194

Abstract: We first show that, in general, a majority-voting game with vote-selling will not have any equilibria. We then evaluate the desirability of vote-selling, using a rudimentary ‘theory of blocking trajectories.’ Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Date: 1988
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00054453

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