An estimate of import surplus under a disequilibrium system

Donald Huddle

Public Choice, 1968, vol. 5, issue 1, 113-120

Abstract: The direct rationing system undeniably resulted in sizable windfall profits for importers, selected exchange officials, and those with political connections. That the rationing system did not operate according to design should not be interpreted as necessarily undesirable, however. In terms of investment, efficient allocation of resources, and price stability criteria, the breakdown of the system may have been better or worse than its perfect operation. It is interesting that the income distributional effects prompted a change rather than efficiency or investment effects. In late 1953 a new system incorporating the acutioning of foreign exchange to importers in a price bidding market was designed to transfer all windfalls to the government. But that importers, functionaries, and politicians succeeded in capturing part of the windfalls attests to the difficulties of operating efficiently a disequilibrium system. Copyright The Center for Studies in Public Choice, Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1968

Date: 1968
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01718689

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