Less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement: Comment

Dwight Lee

Public Choice, 1989, vol. 62, issue 1, 83-87

Abstract: The purpose of this comment has not been to question the main point of Holcombe's paper. Unanimous legislative agreement, if it occurs, could be inefficient for the reasons put forth by Holcombe. The motivation for this comment is that Holcombe's explanation for the existence of legislative unanimity is not a compelling one since it begs an important question. That question is: If the cooperation exists to maintain a unanimous coalition, why does not the cooperation exist to maintain a less-than-unanimous coalition? Unless Holcombe can answer this question satisfactorily, his explanation for legislative unanimity is fundamentally flawed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Date: 1989
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00168017 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:1:p:83-87

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF00168017

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().