Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats

Jan Brueckner and Kevin O'Brien

Public Choice, 1989, vol. 63, issue 1, 15-41

Abstract: This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Date: 1989
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00223270

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