Monopoly power and monitoring: A test using the Gonzalez and Mehay model

Gary Giroux

Public Choice, 1989, vol. 63, issue 1, 73-78

Abstract: In summary, the audit opinion is a control technique that behaves as expected in a GM model. An unqualified opinion seems to be an effective device that is associated with reduced levels of public expenditures. Higher spending is associated with qualified opinions. One interpretation of this result is the use of strategic bureaucratic roadblocks to limit the effectiveness of the audit. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Date: 1989
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00223273

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