Anomalies in Political Economy

Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger ()

Public Choice, 1991, vol. 68, issue 1-3, 89 pages

Abstract: Results in cognitive psychology and experimental economics indicate that under identifiable conditions individuals do not act in an economically rational way. These results are important for political economy. Anomalies appear in the behavior of voters, politicians, and administrators. Economic markets do not fully eliminate anomalies in the aggregation process. It is shown that political aggregation by democracy, bargaining, or bureaucracy may weaken or strengthen such individual anomalies. Moreover, institutions can partially be interpreted as endogenously emerging as a result of individuals' demands to cope with anomalies. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1991
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