Candidate selection and voting behavior in France

Howard Rosenthal and Subrata Sen

Public Choice, 1969, vol. 6, issue 1, 92 pages

Abstract: As a measure of the component of electoral change resulting from candidate selection variables, the foregoing regression analysis suggested that about 3% of all voters in the districts considered change their votes as a consequence of candidate selection policies. In competitive elections, these 3% are a highly significant proportion. Since this change largely favors the Gaullists, one can suggest that the French Left (Communist and Non-Communist) has not manipulated candidate selections as successfully as the Gaullists. Although the patterns of variation are different for Gaullist candidates than for Federation or Communist candidates, we have shown that the performances of new candidates differ systematically from those of old, repeat candidates. Thus, we hope this research suggests the interest of looking at candidate selection strategies and the communications psychology of multiple exposures as relevant variables in the study of voting behavior. The early study of voting behavior was largely influenced by looking at thesocial determinants of voting behavior through such variables as social class, religious practice, race, etc. The use of psychological theory in the study of voting behavior has, in fact, largely been confined to the analysis of the cross-pressures evidenced through these social variables. In other works, we have indicated how elite behavior influences voting behavior through coalition decisions. To this we can now partially suggest how elite behavior influences voting behavior through candidate selection decision. With as much empirical knowledge aboutelite influences as we now have aboutsocial influences, the variations in behavior that we must ascribe to the peculiarities of districts and their candidates may well be very minor. Copyright Center for Studies in Public Choice, Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1969

Date: 1969
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01718579

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