Circumventing Formal Structure through Commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control

Daniel E Ingberman and Dennis A Yao

Public Choice, 1991, vol. 70, issue 2, 79 pages

Abstract: Although the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the Congress and the president ought to provide Congress with agenda power, the president is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship. The authors show that if the president can make "clear-cut" commitments, presidential commitment can counter the dominance heirarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes. Thus, the details of political interactions (in particular, the possibilities for commitment) may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1991
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