The Political Economy of EC Protectionism: National Protectionism Based on Article 115, Treaty of Rome

Ludger Schuknecht

Public Choice, 1991, vol. 72, issue 1, 37-50

Abstract: This paper investigates the trade policy of the EC, based on Art. 115, Treaty of Rome. It is shown that politicians and bureaucrats take advantage of the significant discretion the procedure allows. Political and bureaucratic self-interest are the underlying motives for national trade barriers against nonmember countries based on Art. 115. The empirical results support this hypothesis. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:72:y:1991:i:1:p:37-50

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