The Endogenous Public Choice Theorist
Public Choice, 1992, vol. 73, issue 1, 117-29
Public choice theory has effectively explored defects in collective action and political processes. However, little attention has been given to the fact that any recommendations as to how to improve the situation can only be realized on the basis of precisely those defective institutions. What turns up here can be identified as a problem of self-reference. Normative contributions by J. M. Buchanan and F. A. Hayek may serve as an example. In order to clear up the seemingly paradoxical situation, "endogenization" of the public choice theorist within an extended theory is suggested. A straight-forward extension is briefly outlined. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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