Frequency of Paradox in a Common n-Winner Voting Scheme

Douglas W Mitchell and William N Trumbull

Public Choice, 1992, vol. 73, issue 1, 55-69

Abstract: This paper investigates the extent to which a commonly used electoral scheme--voting for n candidates when there are n vacancies to fill--is likely to lead, in practice, to paradoxical results. Two types of paradox are investigated. One occurs when an increase in the number of vacancies causes a candidate to drop from the list of winners. The second occurs when the Condorcet candidate fails to win. Using a Monte Carlo study, the authors show that the likelihood of paradox can be substantial and depends critically on the degree of homogeneity of voters' preferences and on the number of voters. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1992
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