Equilibria in Multi-party Systems

Hanneke Hermsen and Albert Verbeek

Public Choice, 1992, vol. 73, issue 2, 147-65

Abstract: This paper deals with equilibria in multiparty systems, not excluding systems with two parties. The model has a one-dimensional policy space for the positions of parties and voters. Furthermore, it assumes an arbitrary continuous density of voters, voters vote for the nearest party, and parties try to maximize the number of votes. Sufficient and necessary conditions for equilibria are given and from these conditions it is deduced that equilibria are rare for systems with a large number of parties unless the density of voters is uniform. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1992
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