A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games

David Perez-Castrillo and Thierry Verdier

Public Choice, 1992, vol. 73, issue 3, 335-50

Abstract: In this paper, the authors reconsider the basic model of "efficient rent-seeking." They stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. The authors give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-seeking available to the agents. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1992
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