Pricing in the Nuclear Power Industry: Public or Private Interest?

DeLorme, Charles D,, David R Kamerschen and Thompson, Herbert G,

Public Choice, 1992, vol. 73, issue 4, 385-96

Abstract: This paper tests empirically the Ramsey version of the public-interest theory of regulation by examining the pricing practices in the nuclear power industry using a 1985 cross-sectional sample of forty electric utilities. Other researchers have avoided this segment of the industry because of the difficulties with nuclear fuel data or perceived differences in the underlying production function. The authors show that regulators respond to political influences according to the Stigler-Peltzman version of regulation and that Ramsey pricing cannot be validated, at least for the nuclear segment of the electric power industry. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1992
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