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Favorites and Underdogs: Strategic Behavior in an Experimental Contest

Jason Shogren () and Kyung Hwan Baik

Public Choice, 1992, vol. 74, issue 2, 205 pages

Abstract: Conflicts between favorites and underdogs are everyday phenomena. The authors examine their strategic behavior in an experimental contest and find behavior partially consistent with predictions. Favorites given a first-mover advantage do overcommit effort relative to Nash. Underdogs often select the best response effort level given the favorite's move. Overall dissipation of the prize was significantly higher with the strategic commitment relative to Nash. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1992
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