A Generalized Model of Rent-Seeking Behavior

Bruce Linster

Public Choice, 1993, vol. 77, issue 2, 35 pages

Abstract: In this paper, the author presents a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players' valuations for the prize are represented as vectors. The players in this game are risk neutral and may not be indifferent to who wins the contestable rent if it is someone else. Both G. Tullock's (1967) original rent-seeking model and the public goods rent-seeking model by E. Katz, S. Nitzan, and J. Rosenberg (1990). turn out to be special cases of this more general model. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1993
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