Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto

James Dearden () and Thomas Husted ()

Public Choice, 1993, vol. 77, issue 4, 707-23

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the impact of the governor's line-item veto on the state budget process. The governor's ability to obtain his or her most desired budget measures item veto effectiveness, rather than a smaller expenditure budget. The percentage difference between the final state budget and the governor's original budget request over fiscal years 1983-89 is examined. The emprical results indicate that under certain political situations the line-item veto authority enhances the governor's ability to obtain his or her desired budget. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1993
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